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Abstract
The question of how people form their opinion has fascinated economists and sociologists
for quite some time. In many of the models, a group of people in a social network, each
holding a numerical opinion, arrive at a shared opinion through repeated averaging with their
neighbors in the network. Motivated by the observation that consensus is rarely reached in real
opinion dynamics, we study a related sociological model in which individuals’ intrinsic beliefs
counterbalance the averaging process and yield a diversity of opinions.
By interpreting the repeated averaging as best-response dynamics in an underlying game
with natural payoffs, and the limit of the process as an equilibrium, we are able to study the
cost of disagreement in these models relative to a social optimum. We provide a tight bound on
the cost at equilibrium relative to the optimum; our analysis draws a connection between these
agreement models and extremal problems that lead to generalized eigenvalues. We also consider
a natural network design problem in this setting: which links can we add to the underlying
network to reduce the cost of disagreement at equilibrium?
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1 Introduction
Averaging Opinions in a Social Network
An active line of recent work in economic theory has considered processes by which a group of
people in a social network can arrive at a shared opinion through a form of repeated averaging
[1, 9, 12, 14]. This work builds on a basic model of DeGroot [8], in which we imagine that each
person i holds an opinion equal to a real number zi, which might for example represent a position
on a political spectrum, or a probability that i assigns to a certain belief. There is a weighted graph
G = (V,E) representing a social network, and node i is influenced by the opinions of her neighbors
in G, with the edge weights reflecting the extent of this influence. Now, in each time step node i
updates her opinion to be a weighted average of her current opinion and the current opinions of
her neighbors.
This body of work has developed a set of general conditions under which such processes will
converge to a state of consensus, in which all nodes hold the same opinion. This emphasis on
consensus, however, can only model a specific type of opinion dynamics, where the opinions of the
group all come together. As the sociologist David Krackhardt has observed,
We should not ignore the fact that in the real world consensus is usually not reached. Recognizing this,
most traditional social network scientists do not focus on an equilibrium of consensus. They are instead
more likely to be concerned with explaining the lack of consensus (the variance) in beliefs and attitudes
that appears in actual social influence contexts [16].
In this paper we study a model of opinion dynamics in which consensus is not reached in general,
with the goal of quantifing the inherent social cost of this lack of consensus. To do this, we first
need a framework that captures some of the underlying reasons why consensus is not reached, as
well as a way of measuring the cost of disagreement.
Lack of Agreement and its Cost
We begin from a variation on the DeGroot model due to Friedkin and Johnsen [11], which posits
that each node i maintains a persistent internal opinion si. This internal opinion remains constant
even as node i updates her overall opinion zi through averaging. More precisely, if wi,j ≥ 0 denotes
the weight on the edge (i, j) in G, then in one time step node i updates her opinion to be the
average
zi =
si +
∑
j∈N(i)wi,jzj
1 +
∑
j∈N(i) wi,j
, (1)
where N(i) denotes the set of neighbors of i in G. Note that, in general, the presence of si as a
constant in each iteration prevents repeated averaging from bringing all nodes to the same opinion.
In this way, the model distinguishes between an individual’s intrinsic belief si and her overall
opinion zi; the latter represents a compromise between the persistent value of si and the expressed
opinions of others to whom i is connected. This distinction between si and zi also has parallels
in empirical work that seeks to trace deeply held opinions such as political orientations back to
differences in education and background, and even to explore genetic bases for such patterns of
variation [3].
Now, if consensus is not reached, how should we quantify the cost of this lack of consensus? Here
we observe that since the standard models use averaging as their basic mechanism, we can equiv-
alently view nodes’ actions in each time step as myopically optimizing a quadratic cost function:
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Updating zi as in Equation (1) is the same as choosing zi to minimize
(zi − si)2 +
∑
j∈N(i)
wi,j(zi − zj)2. (2)
We therefore take this as the cost that i incurs by choosing a given value of zi, so that averaging
becomes a form of cost minimization.
Given this view, we can think of repeated averaging as the trajectory of best-response dynamics
in a one-shot, complete information game played by the nodes in V , where i’s strategy is a choice
of opinion zi, and her payoff is the negative of the cost in Equation (2).
Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimality in a Game of Opinion Formation
In this model, repeated averaging does converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game defined
by the individual cost functions in (2): each node i has an opinion xi that is the weighted average
of i’s internal opinion and the (equilibrium) opinions of i’s neighbors. This equilibrium will not in
general correspond to the social optimum, the vector of node opinions y that minimizes the social
cost, defined to be sum of all players’ costs: c(y) =
∑
i
(
(yi − si)2 +
∑
j∈N(i) wi,j(yi − yj)2
)
.
The sub-optimality of the Nash equilibrium can be viewed in terms of the externality created
by a player’s personal optimization: by refusing to move further toward their neighbors’ opinions,
players can cause additional cost to be incurred by these neighbors. In fact we can view the
problem of minimizing social cost for this game as a type of metric labeling problem [6, 15], albeit a
polynomial-time solvable case of the problem with a non-metric quadratic distance function on the
real numbers: we seek node labels that balance the value of a cost function at each node (capturing
disagreement with node-level information) and a cost function for label disagreement across edges.
Viewed this way, the sub-optimality of Nash equilibrium becomes a kind of sub-optimality for local
optimization.
A natural question for this game is thus the price of anarchy, defined as the ratio between the
cost of the Nash equilibrium and the cost of the optimal solution.
Our Results: Undirected Graphs
The model we have described can be used as stated in both undirected and directed graphs — the
only difference is in whether i’s neighbor set N(i) represents the nodes with whom i is connected
by undirected edges, or to whom i links with directed edges. However, the behavior of the price
of anarchy is very different in undirected and directed graphs, and so we analyze them separately,
beginning with the undirected case.
As an example of how a sub-optimal social cost can arise at equilibrium in an undirected graph,
consider the graph depicted in Figure 1 — a three-node path in which the nodes have internal
opinions 0, 1/2, and 1 respectively. As shown in the figure, the ratio between the social cost of
the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum is 9/8. Intuitively, the reason for the higher cost of
the Nash equilibrium is that the center node — by symmetry — cannot usefully shift her opinion
in either direction, and so to achieve optimality the two outer nodes need to compromise more
than they want to at equilibrium. This is a reflection of the externality discussed above, and it is
the qualitative source of sub-optimality in general for equilibrium opinions — nodes move in the
direction of their neighbors, but not sufficiently to achieve the globally minimum social cost.
Our first result is that the very simple example in Figure 1 is in fact extremal for undirected
graphs: we show that for any undirected graph G and any internal opinions vector s, the price of
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Figure 1: An example in which the two players on the sides do not compromise by the optimal amount,
given that the player in the middle should not shift her opinion. The social cost of the optimal set of opinions
is 1/3, while the cost of the Nash equilibrium is 3/8.
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(c) optimal solution.
Figure 2: An example demonstrating that the price of anarchy of a directed graph can be unbounded.
anarchy is at most 9/8. We prove this by casting the question as an extremal problem for quadratic
forms, and analyzing the resulting structure using eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of G. From
this, we obtain a characterization of the set of graphs G for which some internal opinions vector s
yields a price of anarchy of 9/8.
We show that this bound of 9/8 continues to hold even for some generalizations of the model —
when nodes i have different coefficients wi on the cost terms for their internal opinions, and when
certain nodes are “fixed” and simply do not modify their opinions.
Our Results: Directed Graphs
We next consider the case in which G is a directed graph; the form of the cost functions remains
exactly the same, with directed edges playing the role of undirected ones, but the range of possible
behaviors in the model becomes very different. This is due to the fact that nodes can now exert
a large influence over the network without being influenced themselves. Indeed, as Matt Jackson
has observed, directed versions of repeated averaging models can naturally incorporate “external”
media sources; we simply include nodes with no outgoing links, so that they maintain their internal
opinion [14].
We first show that the spectral machinery developed for analyzing undirected graphs can be
extended to the directed case; through an approach based on generalized eigenvalue problems we
can efficiently compute the maximum possible price of anarchy, over all choices of internal node
opinions, on a given graph G. However, in contrast to the case of undirected graphs, the price of
anarchy can be very large in some instances; the simple example in Figure 2 shows a case in which
n − 1 nodes with internal opinion 0 all link to a single node that has internal opinion 1 and no
out-going edges, producing an in-directed star. As a result, the social cost of the Nash equilibrium
is 12(n − 1), whereas the minimum social cost is at most 1, since the player at the center of the
star could simply shift her opinion to 0. Intuitively, this corresponds to a type of social network
in which the whole group pays attention to a single influential “leader” or “celebrity”; this drags
people’s opinions far from their internal opinions si, creating a large social cost. Unfortunately, the
leader is essentially unaware of the people paying attention to her, and hence has no incentive to
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modify her opinion in a direction that could greatly reduce the social cost.
In Section 3 we show that a price of anarchy lower-bounded by a polynomial in n can in fact be
achieved in directed graphs of constant degree, so this behavior is not simply a consequence of large
in-degree. It thus becomes a basic question whether there are natural classes of directed graphs,
and even bounded-degree directed graphs, for which a constant price of anarchy is achievable.
Unweighted Eulerian directed graphs are a natural class to consider — first, because they
generalize undirected graphs, and second, because they capture the idea that at least at a local
level no node has an asymmetric effect on the system. We use our framework for directed graphs to
derive two bounds on the price of anarchy of Eulerian graphs: For Eulerian graphs with maximum
degree ∆ we obtain a bound of ∆ + 1 on the price of anarchy. For the subclass of Eulerian
asymmetric directed graphs1 with maximum degree ∆ and edge expansion α, we show a bound of
O(∆2α−2) on the price of anarchy.
Our Results: Modifying the Network
Finally, we consider an algorithmic problem within this framework of opinion formation. The
question is the following: if we have the ability to modify the edges in the network (subject to
certain constraints), how should we do this to reduce the social cost of the Nash equilibrium by as
much as possible? This is a natural question both as a self-contained issue within the mathematical
framework of opinion formation, and also in the context of applications: many social media sites
overtly and algorithmically consider how to balance the mix of news content [2, 5, 17, 18] and also
the mix of social content [4, 19] that they expose their users to, so as to optimize user engagement
on the site.
Adding edges to reduce the social cost has an intuitive basis: it seems natural that exposing
people to others with different opinions can reduce the extent of disagreement within the group.
When one looks at the form of the social cost c(y), however, there is something slightly counter-
intuitive about the idea of adding edges to improve the situation: the social cost is a sum of
quadratic terms, and by adding edges to G we are simply adding further quadratic terms to the
cost. For this reason, in fact, adding edges to G can never improve the optimal social cost. But
adding edges can improve the social cost of the Nash equilibrium, and sometimes by a significant
amount — the point is that adding terms to the cost function shifts the equilibrium itself, which
can sometimes more than offset the additional terms. For example, if we add a single edge from
the center of the star in Figure 2 to one of the leaves, then the center will shift her opinion to
2/3 in equilibrium, causing all the leaves to shift their opinions to 1/3, and resulting in a Θ(n)
improvement in the social cost. In this case, once the leader pays attention to even a single member
of the group, the social cost improves dramatically.
We focus on three main variants on this question: when all edges must be added to a specific
node (as in the case when a site can modify the amount of attention directed to a media source
or celebrity); when all edges must be added from a specific node (as in the case when a particular
media site tries to shift its location in the space of opinions by blending in content from others);
and when edges can be added between any pair of nodes in the network (as in the case when a social
networking site evaluates modifications to its feeds of content from one user to another [4, 19]).
In Section 4 we show that, in the previously discussed variants, the problem of where to add
edges to optimally reduce the social cost is NP-hard. But we obtain a set of positive results as well,
including a 94 -approximation algorithm when edges can be added between arbitrary pairs of nodes,
1An Eulerian asymmetric directed graph is an Eulerian graph that does not contain any pair of oppositely oriented
edges (i, j) and (j, i).
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and an algorithm to find the optimal amount of additional weight to add to a given edge.
2 Undirected Graphs
We first consider the case of undirected graphs and later handle the more general case of directed
graphs. The main result in this section is a tight bound on the price of anarchy for the opinion-
formation game in undirected graphs. After this, we discuss two slight extensions to the model:
in the first, each player can put a different amount of weight on her internal opinion; and in the
second, each player has several fixed opinions she listens to instead of an internal opinion. We show
that both models can be reduced to the basic form of the model which we study first.
For undirected graphs we can simplify the social cost to the following form:
c(z) =
∑
i
(zi − si)2 + 2
∑
(i,j)∈E,i>j
wi,j(zi − zj)2.
We can write this concisely in matrix form, by using the weighted Laplacian matrix L of G. L
is defined by setting Li,i =
∑
j∈N(i) wi,j and Li,j = −wi,j. We can thus write the social cost as
c(z) = zTAz + ||z − s||2, where the matrix A = 2L captures the tension on the edges. The optimal
solution is the y minimizing c(·). By taking derivatives, we see that the optimal solution satisfies
(A+ I)y = s. Since the Laplacian of a graph is a positive semidefinite matrix, it follows that A+ I
is positive definite. Therefore, (A+ I)y = s has a unique solution: y = (A+ I)−1s.
In the Nash equilibrium x each player chooses an opinion which minimizes her cost; in terms of
the derivatives of the cost functions, this implies that c′i(x) = 0 for all i. Thus, to find the players’
opinions in the Nash equilibrium we should solve the following system of equations: ∀i (xi − si) +∑
j∈N(i) wi,j(xi−xj) = 0. Therefore in the Nash equilibrium each player holds an opinion which is
a weighted average of her internal opinion and the Nash equilibrium opinions of all her neighbors.
This can be succinctly written as (L+ I)x = (12A+ I)x = s. As before
1
2A+ I is a positive definite
matrix, and hence the unique Nash equilibrium is x = (12A+ I)
−1s.
We now begin our discussion on the price of anarchy (PoA) of the opinion game — the ratio
between the cost of the optimal solution and the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
Our main theorem is that the price of anarchy of the opinion game is at most 9/8. Before
proceeding to prove the theorem we present a simple upper bound of 2 on the PoA for undirected
graphs. To see why this holds, note that the Nash equilibrium actually minimizes the function
zT (12A)z+||z−s||2 (one can verify that this function’s partial derivatives are the system of equations
defining the Nash equilibrium). This allows us to write the following bound on the PoA:
PoA =
c(x)
c(y)
≤ 2(x
T (12A)x+ ||x− s||2)
c(y)
≤ 2(y
T (12A)y + ||y − s||2)
c(y)
≤ 2c(y)
c(y)
= 2.
We note that this bound holds only for the undirected case, as in the directed case the Nash
equilibrium does not minimize zT (12A)z + ||z − s||2 anymore.
We now state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2.1 For any graph G and any internal opinions vector s, the price of anarchy of the
opinion game is at most 9/8.
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Proof: The crux of the proof is relating the price of anarchy of an instance to the eigenvalues of its
Laplacian. Specifically, we characterize the graphs and internal opinion vectors with maximal PoA.
In these worst-case instances at least one eigenvalue of the Laplacian is exactly 1, and the vector of
internal opinions is a linear combination of the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalues 1, plus
a possible constant shift for each connected component. As a first step we consider two matrices B
and C that arise by plugging the Nash equilibrium and optimal solution we previously computed
into the cost function and applying simple algebraic manipulations:
c(y) = sT [(A+ I)−1 − I)2 + (A+ I)−1A(A+ I)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
]s
c(x) = sT [(L+ I)−1 − I)2 + (L+ I)−1A(L+ I)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
]s.
Next, we show that the matrices A,B,C are simultaneously diagonalizable: there exists an
orthogonal matrix Q such that A = QΛAQT , B = QΛBQT and C = QΛCQT , where for a matrix
M the notation ΛM represents a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues λM1 , . . . , λ
M
n of M on the
diagonal.
Lemma 2.2 A,B and C are simultaneously diagonalizable by a matrix Q whose columns are eigen-
vectors of A.
Proof: It is a standard fact that any real symmetric matrix M can be diagonalized by an
orthogonal matrix Q such that M = QΛMQT . Q’s columns are eigenvectors of M which are
orthogonal to each other and have a norm of one. Thus in order to show that A, B and C can be
diagonalized with the same matrix Q it is enough to show that all three are symmetric and have
the same eigenvectors. For this we use the following basic fact:
If λN is an eigenvalue of N , λM is an eigenvalue of M and w is an eigenvector of both
then:
1. 1
λ
is an eigenvalue of M−1 and w is an eigenvector of M−1.
2. λN + λM is an eigenvalue of N +M and w is an eigenvector of N +M .
3. λN · λM is an eigenvalue of NM and w is an eigenvector of NM .
From this we can show that any eigenvector of A is also an eigenvector of B and C. Recall that
A is a symmetric matrix, thus, it has n orthogonal eigenvectors which implies that A,B and C are
all symmetric and share the same basis of eigenvectors. Therefore A,B and C are simultaneously
diagonalizable.
We can now express the PoA as a function of the eigenvalues of B and C. By defining s′ = QT s
we have:
PoA =
c(x)
c(y)
=
sTCs
sTBs
=
sTQΛCQT s
sTQΛBQT s
=
s′TΛCs′
s′TΛBs′
=
∑n
i=1 λ
C
i s
′
i
2∑n
i=1 λ
B
i s
′
i
2 ≤ maxi
λCi
λBi
The final step of the proof consists of expressing λCi and λ
B
i as functions of the eigenvalues of
A (denoted by λi) and finding the value for λi maximizing the ratio between λ
C
i and λ
B
i .
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Lemma 2.3 maxi
λCi
λBi
≤ 9/8. The bound is tight if and only if there exists an i such that λi = 2.
Proof: Using the basic facts about eigenvalues which were mentioned in the proof of Lemma 2.2,
we get:
λBi =
(
1− 1
λi + 1
)2
+
1
λi + 1
λi
1
λi + 1
=
λ2i
(λi + 1)2
+
λi
(λi + 1)2
=
λ2i + λi
(λi + 1)2
=
λi
(λi + 1)
λCi =
(
1− 11
2λi + 1
)2
+
1
1
2λi + 1
λi
1
1
2λi + 1
=
λ2i
(λi + 2)2
+
4λi
(λi + 2)2
=
λ2i + 4λi
(λi + 2)2
.
We can now write λCi /λ
B
i = φ(λi), where φ is a simple rational function:
φ(λ) =
(λ2 + 4λ)/(λ + 2)2
λ/(λ+ 1)
=
(λ2 + 4λ)(λ+ 1)
(λ+ 2)2λ
=
(λ+ 4)(λ+ 1)
(λ+ 2)2
=
λ2 + 5λ+ 4
λ2 + 4λ+ 4
.
By taking the derivative of φ, we find that φ is maximized over all λ ≥ 0 at λ = 2 and φ(2) = 9/8.
The eigenvalues λi are all non-negative, so it is always true that maxi φ(λi) ≤ 9/8. If 2 is
an eigenvalue of A (and hence 1 is an eigenvalue of the Laplacian) then there exists an internal
opinions vector s for which the PoA is 9/8.
What is the internal opinions vector maximizing the PoA? To find it assume that the ith
eigenvalue of the Laplacian equals 1. To get a PoA of 9/8 we should choose s′i = 1 and ∀j 6= i s′j = 0
to hit only λi. By definition s
′ = QT s, and hence s = (QT )−1s′. Because Q is orthogonal,
QT = Q−1; thus, s = Qs′ = vi, where vi is the eigenvector associated with λi. In fact, any
linear combination of the eigenvectors associated with eigenvalues 0 and 1 where at least one of the
eigenvectors of 1 has a nonzero coefficient will obtain the maximal PoA.
With Lemma 2.3, we have completed the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.4 We can scale the weights of any graph to make its PoA be 9/8. If α is the scaling
factor for the weights, then the eigenvalues of the scaled A matrix are αλi. Therefore by choosing
α = 2
λi
for any eigenvalue other than 0 we get that there exists an internal opinions vector for
which the PoA is 9/8.
2.1 Arbitrary Node Weights and Players with Fixed Opinions
Our first extension is a model in which different people put different weights on their internal
opinion. In this extension, each node in the graph has a strictly positive weight wi and the cost
function is: c(z) =
∑
i
[wi(zi − si)2 +
∑
j∈N(i)
wi,j(zi − zj)2]. The bound of 9/8 on the PoA holds
even in this model. To see this, let w be the vector of node weights and d(w) be a diagonal
matrix with the values of w on the diagonal. In terms of the scaled variables zˆ = d(
√
w )z,
sˆ = d(
√
w )s and the scaled matrix Aˆ = d(
√
w )−1Ad(
√
w )−1, the cost takes the same form as
before: c(zˆ) = ‖zˆ − sˆ‖2 + zˆT Aˆzˆ. We have therefore proved:
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Claim 2.5 The PoA of the game with arbitrary strictly positive node weights is bounded by 9/8.
Next we show how to handle the case in which a subset of the players may have node weights
of 0, which can equivalently be viewed as a set of players who have no internal opinion at all. We
analyze this by first considering the case in which all non-zero node weights are the same; for this
case we prove:
Lemma 2.6 If every player has either weight 1 or 0 on her internal opinion, then the PoA is
bounded by 9/8.
Proof: Let Z be the set of players who do not have an internal opinion. We define the following
diagonal matrix R: Ri,i = 0 for i ∈ Z and Rj,j = 1 for j /∈ Z. We assume without loss of generality
that Z 6= V since otherwise the PoA is 1. We can also assume without loss of generality that in
the instance which maximizes the PoA each i ∈ Z has an internal opinion of 0. Therefore we can
express the social cost as c(z) = ||z− s||2+ zT (A+R− I)z. Since the cost associated with all i /∈ Z
remains the same while for i ∈ Z the cost of ||zi − si||2 = z2i is countered by the −z2i from the ith
row of zT (R− I)z. Similar to before we have that the optimal solution is y = (A+R)−1s and the
Nash equilibrium is x = (12A + R)
−1s. Since any real vector is an eigenvector of R we have that
(A+R− I), (A+R) and (12A+R) are simultaneously diagonalizable and therefore the same steps
we took to prove Theorem 2.1 lead us to get a bound of 9/8 for the PoA.
By applying the change of variables from Claim 2.5 we can also handle non-zero arbitrary
weights.
In the second model we present, some nodes have fixed opinions and others do not have an
internal opinion at all. We partition the nodes into two sets A and B. Nodes in B are completely
fixed in their opinion and are non-strategic, while nodes in A have no internal opinion – they
simply want to choose an opinion that minimizes their disagreement with their neighbors (which
may include a mix of nodes in A and B). We can think of nodes in A as people forming their
opinion and of nodes in B as news sources with a specific fixed orientation. We denote the fixed
opinion of a node j ∈ B by sj. The social cost for this model is:
c(z) =
∑
(i,j)∈E;
i∈A;j∈B
(zi − sj)2 + 2
∑
(i,j)∈E;
i,j∈A;i>j
(zi − zj)2.
Note that this clearly generalizes the original model, since we can construct a distinct node in
B to represent each internal opinion. Next, we perform the reduction in the opposite direction,
reducing this model to the basic model. To do this, we assign each node an internal opinion equal
to the weighted average of the opinions of her fixed neighbors, and a weight equal to the sum of
her fixed neighbors’ weights. We then show that the PoA of the fixed opinion model is bounded by
the PoA of the basic model and thus get:
Proposition 2.7 The PoA of the fixed opinion model is at most 9/8.
Proof: We reduce an instance of the fixed opinion game to an instance of the opinion game
with arbitrary node weights as follows: We define the internal opinion of every player i ∈ A
that has at least one neighbor in B to be a weighted average of the opinions i’s neighbors in B:
si =
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,jsj∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j
, where NB(i) is the set of i’s neighbors in B. We also define node i’s weight
to be wi =
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j. For a player i ∈ A who does not have any neighbors in B we simply
define wi = 0. We use G to denote the initial instance, and G
′ to denote the instance produced
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by the reduction. Let x be the Nash equilibrium in G; then x is also the Nash equilibrium in G′.
To see this, recall that in a Nash equilibrium each player’s opinion is the weighed average of the
opinions of all neighbors. Thus,
xi =
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,jsj +
∑
j∈NA(i)
wi,jyj∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j +
∑
j∈NA(i)
wi,j
=
(
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j)
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,jsj
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j
+
∑
j∈NA(i)
wi,jyj∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j +
∑
j∈NA(i)
wi,j
.
In Claim 2.8 below we show that cG(z) = cG′(z)+c for a positive constant c, hence, the optimal
solution for G and G′ is the same. Let y be this optimal solution and let x be G’s and G′’s Nash
equilibrium. By deriving the following bound we conclude the proof:
PoA(G) =
cG(x)
cG(y)
≤ cG′(x) + c
cG′(y) + c
≤ cG′(x)
cG′(y)
≤ 9
8
.
Claim 2.8 cG(z) = cG′(z) + c where c is a positive constant.
Proof: We show that cG(z) ≥ cG′(z) and cG(z) − cG′(z) is constant. Observe that the only
terms where the two costs differ are ones associated with the cost of the fixed opinions in G and
the internal opinions in G′. Thus, it is enough to show that for every player i:
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j(sj − zi)2 ≥

 ∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j

 ·
(∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,jsj∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j
− zi
)2
.
By arranging the terms we get that the terms involving zi’s cancel out, hence what left to show is
that:
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,js
2
j ≥
(
∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,jsj)
2∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j
. The claim follows from the following computation:

 ∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,jsj

2 = ∑
j∈NB(i)
w2i,js
2
j +
∑
j,k∈NB(i),j≥k
2wi,jwi,ksjsk
≤
∑
j∈NB(i)
w2i,js
2
j +
∑
j,k∈NB(i),j≥k
wi,jwi,k(s
2
j + s
2
k)
=

 ∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,j



 ∑
j∈NB(i)
wi,js
2
j

 .
3 Directed Graphs
We begin our discussion of directed graphs with an example showing that the price of anarchy can
be unbounded even for graphs with bounded degrees. Our main result in this section is that we can
nevertheless develop spectral methods extending those in Section 2 to find internal opinions that
maximize the PoA for a given graph. Using this approach, we identify classes of directed graphs
with good PoA bounds.
In the introduction we have seen that the PoA of an in-directed star can be unbounded. As a
first question, we ask whether this is solely a consequence of the unbounded maximum in-degree of
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this graph, or whether it is possible to have an unbounded PoA for a graph with bounded degrees.
Our next example shows that one can obtain a large PoA even when all degrees are bounded: we
show that the PoA of a bounded degree tree can be Θ(nc), where c ≤ 1 is a constant depending on
the in-degrees of the nodes in the tree.
Example 3.1 Let G be a 2k-ary tree of depth log2k n in which the internal opinion of the root is
1 and the internal opinion of every other node is 0. All edges are directed toward the root. In the
Nash equilibrium all nodes at layer i hold the same opinion, which is 2−i. (The root is defined
to be at layer 0.) The cost of a node at layer i is 2 · 2−2i. Since there are 2ik nodes at layer i,
the total social cost at Nash equilibrium is
log
2k
n∑
i=1
2ik21−2i = 2
log
2k
n∑
i=1
2(k−2)i. For k > 2 this cost is
2k−1
(2k−2)log2k n − 1
2k−2 − 1 = 2
k−1n
k−2
k − 1
2k−2 − 1 . The cost of the optimal solution is at most 1; in fact it is
very close to 1, since in order to reduce the cost the root should hold an opinion of ǫ very close to
0, which makes the root’s cost approximately 1. Therefore the PoA is Θ(n
k−2
k ). It is instructive to
consider the PoA for extreme values of k. For k = 2, the PoA is Θ(log n), while for k = log n we
recover the in-directed star from the introduction where the PoA is Θ(n). For intermediate values
of k, the PoA is Θ(nc). For example, for k = 3 we get that the PoA is Θ(n
1
3 ).
For directed graphs we do not consider the generalization to arbitrary node weights (along the
lines of Section 2.1), noting instead that introducing node weights to directed graphs can have a
severe effect on the PoA. That is, even in graphs containing only two nodes, introducing arbitrary
node weights can make the PoA unbounded. For example, consider a graph with two nodes i and
j. Node i has an internal opinion of 0 and a node weight of 1, while node j has an internal opinion
of 1 and a node weight of ǫ. There is a directed edge (i, j) with weight 1. There cost of the Nash
equilibrium is 1/2, but the social cost of the optimal solution is smaller than ǫ. To avoid this
pathology, from now on we restrict our attention to uniform node weights.
3.1 The Price of Anarchy in a General Graph
For directed graphs the cost of the optimal solution and the cost of the Nash equilibrium are
respectively c(y) = sTBs and c(x) = sTCs, as before. But now, C has a slightly more complicated
form since L is no longer a symmetric matrix. Recall that matrix A is used in the social cost function
to capture the cost associated with the edges of the graph (disagreement between neighbors). We
define it for directed graph by setting Ai,j = −wi,j − wj,i for i 6= j and Ai,i =
∑
j∈N(i) wi,j +∑
{j|i∈N(j)}wj,i. The matrix A is the weighted Laplacian for an undirected graph where the weight
on the undirected edge (i, j) is the sum of the weights in the directed graph for edges (i, j) and
(j, i). We then define C =
(
(L+ I)−1 − I)T ((L+ I)−1 − I) + (L+ I)−TA(L+ I)−1. The price of
anarchy, therefore, is
sTCs
sTBs
as before. The primary distinction between the price of anarchy in the
directed and undirected cases is that in the undirected case, B and C are both rational functions
of A. In the directed case, no such simple relation exists between B and C, so that we cannot
easily bound the generalized eigenvalues for the pair (and hence the price of anarchy) for arbitrary
graphs. However, given a directed graph our main theorem shows that we can always find the
vector of internal opinions s yielding the maximum PoA:
Theorem 3.2 Given a graph G it is possible to find the internal opinions vector s yielding the
maximum PoA up to a precision of ǫ in polynomial time.
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Proof: The total social cost is invariant under constant shifts in opinion. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we restrict our attention to the space of opinion vectors with mean zero. Let
us define a matrix P ∈ Rn×(n−1) to have Pj,j = 1, Pj+1,j = −1, and Pi,j = 0 otherwise. The
columns of P are a basis for the space of vectors with mean zero; that is, we can write any such
vector as s = P sˆ for some sˆ. We also define matrices B¯ = P TBP and C¯ = P TCP , which are
positive definite if the symmetrized graph is connected. The price of anarchy is then given by
the generalized Rayleigh quotient ρC¯,B¯(sˆ) = (sˆ
T C¯sˆ)/(sˆT B¯sˆ). Stationary points of ρC¯,B¯ satisfy the
generalized eigenvalue equation (C − ρC¯,B¯(sˆ)B¯)sˆ = 0. In particular, the price of anarchy is the
largest generalized eigenvalue, and the associated eigenvector sˆ∗ corresponds to the maximizing
choice of internal opinions.
The solution of generalized eigenvalue problems is a standard technique in numerical linear
algebra, and there are good algorithms that run in polynomial time; see [13, §8.7]. In particular,
because B¯ is symmetric and positive definite, we can use the Cholesky factorization B¯ = RTR to
reduce the problem to the standard eigenvalue problem (R−T C¯R−1 − λI)(Rsˆ) = 0.
3.2 Upper Bounds for Classes of Graphs
Our goal in this section is rather simple: we would like to find families of graphs for which we can
bound the price of anarchy. The main tool we use is bounding the cost of the Nash equilibrium by
a function of a simple structure. By using a function that has a similar structure to the social cost
function we are able to frame the bound as a generalized eigenvalue problem that can be solved
using techniques similar to the ones that were used in proving Theorem 2.1.
Proposition 3.3 Let G be a graph family for which there exists a β such that for any G ∈ G and
any internal opinions vector s, we have c(x) ≤ minz(β(zTAz) + ||z − s||2). Then, ∀G ∈ G and
opinion vectors s, PoA(G) ≤ β+βλ21+βλ2 , where λ2 is the second smallest eigenvalue of A.
Proof: Let y˜ be the vector minimizing β(zTAz) + ||z − s||2. We can derive the following bound
on the price of anarchy:
PoA(G) =
c(x)
c(y)
≤ β(y˜
TAy˜) + ||y˜ − s||2
(yTAy) + ||y − s||2 =
sTCs
sTBs
,
where C and B are defined similarly to the matrices in Theorem 2.1 and are simultaneously diago-
nalizable. If λi is an eigenvalue of A then λ
B
i =
λi
1+λi
and λCi =
βλi
1+βλi
. As before, the maximum PoA
is achieved when λCi /λ
B
i =
βλi
1+βλi
/ λi1+λi =
βλi+β
βλi+1
is maximized. The maximum here is taken over
all eigenvalues different than 0 as we know that the PoA for the internal opinions vector associated
with eigenvalue 0 (which is a constant vector) is 1. Therefore, the maximizing eigenvalue is λ2.
An immediate corollary is that if there exists a β as in Proposition 3.3 then the PoA is bounded
by this β.
We say that a bounded degree asymmetric expander is an unweighted directed graph that does
not contain any pair of oppositely oriented edges (i, j) and (j, i), and whose symmetrized graph
has maximum degree ∆ and edge expansion α. We show:
Claim 3.4 For a bounded degree asymmetric expander the PoA is bounded by O(∆2/α2).
Proof: For an asymmetric graph, the matrix A is simply the Laplacian of the underlying graph;
this is why we require in the claim that the graph is asymmetric.
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If ∆ is the maximum degree, then we have λ2 ≤ λn ≤ ∆. We also have that λ2 ≥ α2/2∆ [7].
We can now use this to bound the PoA in terms of the graph’s expansion as follows:
β + βλ2
1 + βλ2
≤ β + βλ2
βλ2
≤ 1 + λ2
λ2
≤ 2∆(1 +∆)
α2
= O(∆2/α2).
The next natural question is for which graph families such a β exists. Intuitively, such a β
exists whenever the cost of the Nash equilibrium is smaller than the cost of the best consensus —
that is, the optimal solution restricted to opinion vectors in which all players hold the same opinion
(constant vectors). This is true since the function β(zTAz)+ ||z− s||2 is the social cost function of
a network in which the weights of all edges have been multiplied by β. However using this intuition
for finding graph families for which β exists is difficult and furthermore does not help in computing
the value of β (or a bound on it). Hence, we take a different approach. In Lemma 3.5, we introduce
an intermediate function g(·) with the special property that its minimum value is the same as the
cost of the Nash equilibrium. By showing that there exists a β such that g(z) ≤ βzTAz+||z−s||2 we
are able to present bounds for Eulerian bounded-degree graphs and additional bounds for Eulerian
bounded-degree asymmetric expanders. As a first step, we use Schur complements to prove the
following:
Lemma 3.5 Let g(z) = zTMz+ ||z− s||2 with M = (I −C)−1− I. If (I −C) is nonsingular then
for the Nash equilibrium x, we have minz g(z) = c(x).
Proof: The social cost is a quadratic function of the expressed opinion vector and the internal
opinion vector:
c(z) = zTAz + ‖z − s‖2 =
[
z
s
]T [
A+ I −I
−I I
] [
z
s
]
.
To compute the socially optimal vector, we minimize this quadratic form in z and s subject to
constraints on s. This yields c(y) = sTBs, where the matrix
B = ((A+ I)−1 − I)2 + (A+ I)−1A(A+ I)−1 = I − (A+ I)−1
is a Schur complement in the larger system2. Schur complements typically arise in partial elim-
ination of variables from linear systems. In this case, we have eliminated the z variables in the
stationary equations for a critical point in the extended quadratic form.
Now consider the Nash equilibrium. As we assume that (I − C) is invertible, we can define
M = (I − C)−1 − I.
The matrix M is symmetric and positive semidefinite, with a null space consisting of the constant
vectors. That is, we can see M as the Laplacian of a new graph. By design, C = I − (M + I)−1,
so we can mimic the construction above to express C as a Schur complement in a larger system.
Thus, the social cost of the Nash equilibrium can be written
c(x) = min
z
[
z
s
]T [
M + I −I
−I I
] [
z
s
]
,
which is the optimal social cost in the new network.
We then complement the lemma by showing that for Eulerian graphs (I − C) is nonsingular
and furthermore the matrix M has a nice structure:
2Recall that the Schur complement of the block A of the matrix
[
A B
C D
]
is D − CA−1B.
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Claim 3.6 For Eulerian graphs M = A+ LLT .
Proof: We denote L˜ = L+ I and A˜ = A+ I then:
I − C = I − (L˜−1 − I)T (L˜−1 − I)− L˜−T (A˜− I)L˜−1
= L˜−1 + L˜−T − L˜−T A˜L˜−1.
We use the fact that for Eulerian graphs A = L+LT which implies that A˜ = L˜+ L˜T − I to simplify
I − C:
I −C = L˜−1 + L˜−T − L˜−T (L˜+ L˜T − I)L˜−1
= L˜−T L˜−1.
We have that M = (L + I)(L + I)T − I = A + LLT . Let us understand what the matrix LLT
looks like. On the diagonal we have [LLT ]i,i = d
2
i + di where di is the degree of node i and off the
diagonal [LLT ]i,j = diLj,i + djLi,j +
∑
k 6=i,j(Li,kLj,k) = diLj,i + djLi,j + |N(i) ∩N(j)|.
Recall that ∆ is the he maximum degree of an Eulerian graph. We are now ready to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.7 For Eulerian graphs c(x) ≤ (∆ + 1)(zTAz) + ||z − s||2.
Proof: By Lemma 3.5 and Claim 3.6 we have that for Eulerian graphs c(x) = minz g(z) =
minz z
T (A + LLT )z + ||z − s||2. What remains to show is that for β = ∆ + 1 it holds that
g(z) ≤ βzTAz + ||z − s||2. After some rearranging this boils down to showing that the following
holds zTLLT z ≤ (β − 1)zTAz
Note that A is the Laplacian for a symmetrized version of the graph; assuming this graph is
connected (since otherwise we can work separately in each component), this means A has one zero
eigenvalue corresponding to the constant vectors, and is positive definite on the space orthogonal
to the constant vector. Similarly, LLT has a zero eigenvalue corresponding to the constant vectors,
and is at least positive semi-definite on the space orthogonal to the constant vectors. Since A is
positive definite on the space of nonconstant vectors, the smallest possible β can be computed via
the solution of a generalized eigenvalue problem
β = 1 +max
z 6=αe
zTLLT z
zTAz
.
In the case of an unweighted graph, one get a bound via norm inequalities. Using the fact that
the graph is Eulerian, LT is also a graph Laplacian, and we can write
(
LT z
)
i
=
n∑
j=1
wj,i(zi − zj),
so
zTLLT z =
n∑
i=1

 n∑
j=1
wj,i(zi − zj)

2 .
Similarly, we expand the quadratic form zTAz into
zTAz =
∑
i<j
(wi,j + wj,i)(zi − zj)2 =
n∑
i=1

 n∑
j=1
wj,i(zi − zj)2

 .
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Now, recall that in general
(∑d
j=1 xj
)2
≤ d∑dj=1 x2j , which means that in the unweighted case(∑n
j=1wj,i(zi − zj)
)2
≤ di
(∑n
j=1wj,i(zi − zj)2
)
. where di =
∑
j wj,i is the in-degree or out-degree.
Therefore,
zTLLT z
zTAz
≤
∑n
i=1 di
∑n
j=1wj,i(zi − zj)2∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1wj,i(zi − zj)2
≤ max
i
di = ∆.
So for a general Eulerian graph, β ≤ 1 + ∆.
We observe that for a cycle the bound of 2 on the price of anarchy is actually tight:
Observation 3.8 The PoA of a directed cycle is bounded by 2 and approaches 2 as the size of the
cycle grows.
Proof: For a cycle it is the case that A = LLT ; therefore g(z) = 2(zTAz) + ||z − s||2, and hence
the bound assumed in Proposition 3.3 is actually a tight bound. In order to show that the PoA
indeed approaches 2 we need to show that λ2 approaches 0 as the size of the cycle grows. The fact
that A is the Laplacian of an undirected cycle comes to our aid and provide us an exact formula
for λ2: λ2 = 2(1− cos(2pin )) (where n is the size of the cycle), and this concludes the proof.
For general Eulerian graphs we leave open the question of whether the bound of ∆+1 is a tight
bound or not. Indeed, it is an intriguing open question whether there exists a Eulerian graph with
PoA greater than 2.
4 Adding Edges to the Graph
The next thing we consider is the following class of problems: Given an unweighted graph G and a
vector of internal opinions s, find edges E′ to add to G so as to minimize the social cost of the Nash
equilibrium. We begin with a general bound linking the possible improvement from adding edges
to the price of anarchy. Let G be a graph (either undirected or directed). Denote by cG(·) the cost
function and by x and y the Nash equilibrium and optimal solution respectively. Let G′ be the
graph constructed by adding edges to G. Then:
cG(x)
cG′(x′)
≤ cG(x)
cG′(y′)
≤ cG(x)
cG(y)
= PoA(G). To see why
this is the case, we first note that cG′(y
′) ≤ cG′(x′) since the cost of the Nash equilibrium cannot
be smaller than the optimal solution. Second, cG(y) ≤ cG′(y′) simply because cG′(·) contains more
terms than cG(·). Therefore we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 Adding edges to a graph G can improve the cost of the Nash equilibrium by a
multiplicative factor of at most the PoA of G.
We study three variants on the problem, discussed in the introduction. In all variants, we seek
the “best” edges to add in order to minimize the social cost of the Nash equilibrium. The variants
differ mainly in the types of edges we may add.
Adding edges from a specific node
First, we consider the case in which we can only add edges from a specific node w. Here we imagine
that node w is a media source that therefore does not have any cost for holding an opinion, and so
we will use a cost function that ignores the cost associated with it when computing the social cost.
Hence, our goal is to find a set of nodes F such that adding edges from node w to all the nodes in
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F minimizes the cost of the Nash equilibrium while ignoring the cost exhibited by w. By reducing
the subset sum problem to this problem we show that:
Proposition 4.2 Finding the best set of edges to add from a specific node w is NP-hard.
Proof: Denote by G + F the graph constructed by adding to G edges from w to all nodes in
F . Our goal is to find a set F minimizing c˜G+F (x), where x is a Nash equilibrium in the graph
G + F and c˜ denotes the total cost of all nodes in x except for node w. We show that finding
this set is NP-hard by reducing the subset sum problem to this problem. Recall that in the subset
sum problem we are given a set of positive integers a1, . . . , an and a number t. We would like to
know if there exists any subset S such that
∑
j∈S aj = t. Given an instance of the subset problem,
we reduce it to the following instance of the opinion game. The instance conatins an in-directed
star with n peripheral nodes that have an internal opinion of 0 and a center node w which has an
internal opinion of 1 and n isolated nodes that have internal opinions of −ai
t
.
Lemma 4.3 For the graph G and the vector of internal opinions s defined above, there exists a set
F such that c˜G+F (x) = 0 if and only if the answer to the subset problem is yes.
Proof: As seen in the introduction, in the Nash equilibrium each one of the peripheral nodes
holds an opinion of 12xw. Node w hold an opinion of xw =
1 +
∑
j∈F sj
1 + |F | . Therefore the cost of the
Nash equilibrium in G+ F is:
c˜G+F (x) = n
(
(
1
2
xw − 0)2 + (xw − 1
2
xw)
2
)
= 2n
(
1 +
∑
j∈F sj
2(1 + |F |)
)2
.
Clearly the cost is nonnegative as it is a sum of quadratic terms; moreover it equals 0 if and only if∑
j∈F sj = −1. Defining F ′ = {j ∈ F |sj < 0}, we have
∑
j∈F ′ sj = −1. By the reduction we have
that
∑
j∈F ′ −ajt = −1; if we multiply by −t we get that
∑
j∈F ′ aj = t implying that there exists a
solution to the subset sum problem.
Adding edges to a specific node
Next, we consider the case in which we can only add edges to a specific node. We can imagine
again that node w is a media source; in this case, however, our goal is to find the best set of people
to expose to this media source. By reducing the minimum vertex cover problem to this problem
we show that:
Proposition 4.4 Finding the best set of edges to add to a specific node w is NP-hard.
Proof: Given an instance of the minimum vertex cover problem, consisting of an undirected
graph G′ = (V ′, E′), we construct an instance of the opinions game as follows:
• For each edge (i, j) ∈ E′ we create a vertex vi,j with internal opinion 1.
• For every vi,j we create an in-directed star with 24 peripheral nodes that have an internal
opinion of 0. We later refer to node vi,j and all the nodes directed to it as vi,j’s star.
• For each vertex i ∈ V ′ we create a vertex ui with internal opinion 1.
• For each edge (i, j) ∈ E′ we create directed edges (vi,j, ui) and (vi,j , uj).
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• We create an isolated node w with internal opinion −3.
Let T be the set of vertices such that adding edges from all the nodes in T to node w minimizes
the cost of the Nash equilibrium. Denote by G + T the graph constructed by adding to G edges
from all nodes in T to w. Observe that T cannot contain any nodes with internal opinion of 0 as
adding an edge from a node with internal opinion 0 to w which has internal opinion −3 can only
increase the cost of the Nash equilibrium. Thus, T contains only vertices of type vi,j and ui. In
the table in Figure 3 we compute vi,j’s opinion in the Nash equilibrium and the cost of its star as
a function of which vertices that influence vi,j are in T . For example in the first row we consider
the case in which vi,j, ui, uj /∈ T . In this case, vi,j’s opinion is (1 + 1 + 1)/3 = 1 and the cost of its
star is 12 · 24 = 12. We use the costs in this table to reason about the structure of T and the cost
of the Nash equilibrium in G+ T .
Configuration vi,j’s opinion vi,j’s star cost
1 vi,j, ui, uj /∈ T 1 12
2 vi,j ∈ T, ui, uj /∈ T 0 12
3 vi,j, ui ∈ T, uj /∈ T −1/2 14
4 vi,j, ui, uj ∈ T −1 20
5 vi,j, uj /∈ T, ui ∈ T 1/3 4
6 vi,j /∈ T, ui, uj ∈ T −1/3 4
Figure 3: The total cost of vi,j’s star for different configurations
In Lemma 4.5 we show how to construct from T a set T ′ such that cG+T ′(x
′) = cG+T (x) and T
′
is a pseudo vertex cover. We say that a set T ′ is a pseudo vertex cover if it obeys two properties:
first, it contains only vertices of the type ui. Second, the vertices in V
′ corresponding to the ui’s
in V constitute a vertex cover in G′.
Next, we consider the cost of the Nash equilibrium in the graph G + S where S is a pseudo
vertex cover: By the table in Figure 3 we have the cost associated with every vi,j ’s star is 4. This
is by the fact that S is a pseudo vertex cover and hence the only applicable cases are 5 and 6, in
both cases the total cost of vi,j’s star is 4. Also, note that the cost for each ui ∈ S is 8. Hence, the
total cost of the Nash equilibrium for network G + S is f(S) = 4|E| + 8|S|. By construction, T ′
is a pseudo vertex cover and it also minimizes f(·), since cG+T (x) = cG+T ′(x′) = 4|E| + 8|T ′| and
T is optimal. Therefore T ′ corresponds to a minimum vertex cover in G′. A key element in this
reduction is the property that the cost of vi,j’s star is the same, whether ui ∈ T ′ or both ui and uj
belong to T ′.
Lemma 4.5 There exists a pseudo vertex cover T ′ such that cG+T ′(x
′) = cG+T (x)
Proof: First, we obtain T ′′ by removing from T all vertices of type vi,j. We have that cG+T ′′(x
′′) ≤
cG+T (x) since by examining the table in Figure 3 we observe that including vertices of type vi,j in
T ′′ can only increase the cost of the Nash equilibrium. Since T is optimal, it has to be the case that
cG+T ′′(x
′′) = cG+T (x). Next, to get T
′ we take T ′′ and for each vertex vi,j such that ui, uj /∈ T ′′
we add ui to T
′. By adding these vertices we have not increased the cost since in the worst case
vi,j’s star and ui have a total cost of 12 which is the same as their previous total cost. As before
by the optimality of T we could not have reduced the cost by adding the vertices, therefore it still
holds that cG+T ′(x
′) = cG+T (x). To complete the proof observe that by construction T
′ is a pseudo
vertex cover.
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Adding an arbitrary set of edges
In the last case we consider, which is the most general one, we can add any set of edges. For this
case we leave open the question of the hardness of adding an unrestricted set of edges. We do show
that finding the best set of k arbitrary edges is NP-hard. This is done by a reduction from k-dense
subgraph [10] :
Proposition 4.6 Finding a best set of arbitrary k edges is NP-hard.
Proof: We show a reduction from the “Dense k-Subgraph Problem” defined in [10]: given an
undirected graph G′ = (V ′, E′) and a parameter k, find a set of k vertices with maximum average
degree in the subgraph induced by this set. Given an instance of the “Dense k-Subgraph Problem”
we create an instance of the opinion game as follows:
• For every edge (i, j) ∈ E′ we create a node vi,j with internal opinion 0.
• For every vertex i ∈ V ′ we create a node ui with internal opinion 1.
• For every vi,j we add directed edges (vi,j , ui) and (vi,j , uj).
• For every ui we create an in-directed star with 20 peripheral nodes that have an internal
opinion of 0.
• Finally, we create a single isolated vertex w with internal opinion -1.
The proof is composed of two lemmas. In Lemma 4.7 we show that all edges in the minimizing set
are of type (ui, w). Then we denote by T the set of nodes of type ui such that adding an edge from
each one of these nodes to w minimizes the cost, and in Lemma 4.8 we show that T is a k densest
subgraph.
Lemma 4.7 The best set of edges to add contains only edges from nodes of type ui to w.
Proof: Our first observation is that any edge which is not from nodes of type ui affects the cost
of at most one node. This is simply because all nodes in the graph, if affected by any node at
all, are affected by nodes of type ui. The cost of each one of the nodes in the graph in the Nash
equilibrium is at most 1, and therefore the improvement in the cost from adding any such edge is
at most 1. On the other hand, adding an edge from nodes of type ui to w reduces the cost by at
least 1220 − 2(1 − 0)2 = 8. It is easy to verify that adding edges from nodes of type ui to other
nodes has a smaller effect on i’s cost.
Lemma 4.8 The previously defined set T is a solution to the dense k-subgraph problem.
Proof: The key point is the fact that the cost associated with a node of type vi,j is 0 if and only
if both ui and uj are in T ; otherwise this cost is exactly
2
3 . When ui ∈ T , the opinion of ui in the
Nash equilibrium is 0 since it is averaging between 1 and −1. Therefore node vi,j ’s associated cost
in the Nash equilibrium is:
• 0 - if both ui and uj are in T - since vi,j holds opinion 0.
• 23 - if both ui and uj are not in T - since vi,j ’s opinion is 23 and therefore the cost is (0− 23)2+
2(1 − 23)2 = 23 .
• 23 - if only one of ui, uj is in T - then vi,j ’s opinion is 13 and therefore the cost is (0 − 13)2 +
(0− 13)2 + (1− 13)2 = 23 .
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Hence to minimize the cost of the Nash equilibrium we should choose a set T maximizing the
number of nodes of type vi,j for which both ui and uj are in T . In the graph G
′ from the k-dense
subgraph problem that set T is a set of vertices and what we are looking for is the set T with an
induced graph that has the maximum number of edges. By definition this set is exactly a k-densest
subgraph.
Finding approximation algorithms for all of the problems discussed in propositions 4.2, 4.4,
and 4.6 is an interesting question. As a first step we offer a 94 -approximation for the problem of
optimally adding edges to a directed graph G — a problem whose hardness for exact optimization
we do not know. The approximation algorithm works simply by including the reverse copy of every
edge in G that is not already in G; this produces a bi-directed graph G′.
Claim 4.9 cG′(x
′) ≤ 94cG(y).
Proof: By Theorem 2.1 we have that cG′(x
′) ≤ 98cG′(y′). Also notice that in the worst case, in
order to get from G to G′, we must double all the edges in G. Therefore cG′(y
′) ≤ 2cG(y). By
combining the two we have that cG′(x
′) ≤ 94cG(y).
For weighted graphs we can also include reverse copies of edges that do appear in G and hence
achieve an approximation ratio of 2 for analogous reasons.
4.1 Adding a Single Weighted Edge
We now consider how to optimally choose the weight to put on a single edge (i, j), to minimize the
cost of the Nash equilibrium. Suppose we add weight ρ to the edge (i, j). The modified Laplacian
is L′ = L+ ρei(ei − ej)T , where ei is the ith vector in the standard basis. The modified Nash
equilibrium is x′ = (L′ + I)−1s = ((L+ I) + ρei(ei − ej)T )−1s.
Using the Sherman-Morrison formula for the rank-one update to an inverse [13, §2.1.3], we have
x′ =
[
(L+ I)−1 − (L+ I)
−1ρei(ei − ej)T (L+ I)−1
1 + ρ(ei − ej)T (L+ I)−1ei
]
s
= x− vi
(
ρ(xi − xj)
1 + ρ(vi,i − vi,j)
)
,
where vi = (L+ I)
−1ei is the influence of si on the Nash opinions in the original graph. Therefore,
vi gives the direction of change of the Nash equilibrium when the weight on (i, j) is increased: the
equilibrium opinions all shift in the direction of vi. We prove the following key properties of this
influence vector vi:
Lemma 4.10 The entries of vi = (L+ I)
−1ei lie in [0, 1], and vi,i is the unique maximum entry.
Proof: The influence vector vi is simply the Nash equilibrium for the internal opinion vector ei.
The Nash equilibrium is the limit of repeated averaging starting from the internal opinions, and
the average of numbers in [0, 1] is in [0, 1]. Thus the entries of vi are in [0, 1].
We show that vi,i is the maximal entry by contradiction. Suppose vi,j is maximal for some
j 6= i. Because L + I is nonsingular, vi cannot be the zero vector, so vi,j > 0. The equilibrium
equations for j can be written
vi,j =
∑
k∈N(j) wj,kvi,k
1 +
∑
k∈N(j)wj,k
≤
( ∑
k∈N(j)wj,k
1 +
∑
k∈N(j)wj,k
)
max
k∈N(j)
vi,k ≤ max
k∈N(j)
vi,k
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where the final inequality is strict if vi,k 6= 0 for any k ∈ N(j). But vi,k 6= 0 for some k ∈ N(j),
since otherwise vi,j would be zero. Therefore, there must be some k ∈ N(j) such that vi,k > vi,j,
which contradicts the hypothesis that vi,j is maximal.
We now show how to choose the optimal weight ρ to add to edge (i, j) to best reduce the social
cost of the Nash equilbrium.
Theorem 4.11 The optimal weight ρ to add to the edge (i, j) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: Note that
x′i − x′j = (xi − xj)
(
1− ρ(vi,i − vi,j)
1 + ρ(vi,i − vi,j)
)
=
xi − xj
1 + ρ(vi,i − vi,j) ,
and we can write the new Nash equilibrium as x′ = x− φvi, where
φ =
ρ(xi − xj)
1 + ρ(vi,i − vi,j) = ρ(xi − xj)
x′i − x′j
xi − xj = ρ(x
′
i − x′j).
For small values of ρ, we have that φ = ρ(xi − xj) + O(ρ2); and as ρ → ∞, we have that φ →
φmax = (xi−xj)/(vi,i− vi,j) and x′i−x′j → 0. Thus, adding a small amount of weight to edge (i, j)
moves the Nash equilibrium in the direction of the influence vector vi proportional to the weight
ρ and the discrepancy xi − xj; while adding larger amounts of weight moves the Nash equilibrium
by a bounded amount in the direction of the influence vector vi, with the asymptotic limit of large
edge weight corresponding to the case when i and j have the same opinion.
What does adding a weighted edge between i and j do to the social cost at Nash equilibrium?
In the modified graph, the social cost is
c′(z) = zTAz + ρ(zi − zj)2 + ‖z − s‖2.
At the new Nash equilibrium, we have
c′(x′) = x′TAx′ + ρ(x′i − x′j)2 + ‖x′ − s‖2
= x′TAx′ + φ(x′i − x′j) + ‖x′ − s‖2.
Because x′ is a linear function of φ, the above shows that c′(x′) is a quadratic function of φ, which
we can simplify to c′(x′) = αijφ
2 − 2βijφ+ c(x), where
αij = v
T
i (A+ I)vi − (vi,i − vi,j)
βij = v
T
i ((A+ I)x− s)−
1
2
(xi − xj).
The range of possible values for φ is between 0 (corresponding to ρ = 0) and φmax (corresponding
to the limit as ρ goes to infinity). Subject to the constraints on the range of φ, the quadratic in φ
is minimal either at 0, at φmax, or at βij/αij (assuming this point is between 0 and φmax). We can
therefore determine the optimal weight for a single edge in polynomial time.
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Note that the above computations also give us a simple formula for the gradient components
γij corresponding to differentiation with respect to wij :
γij ≡ d[c
′(x′)]
dρ
=
d[c′(x′)]
dφ
dφ
dρ
= −2βij(xi − xj)
= (xi − xj)2 − 2(xi − xj)vTi ((A+ I)x− s).
The residual vector (A + I)x − s measures the extent to which x fails to satisfy the equation for
the socially optimal opinion y. If this vector is large enough, and if the influence vector vi is
sufficiently well aligned with the residual, then adding weight to the (i, j) edge can decrease the
social cost at Nash equilibrium. Thus, though computing a globally optimal choice of additional
edge weights may be NP-hard, we can generally compute locally optimal edge additions via the
method of steepest descent.
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